What is an exploit kit?

Attackers who want to infect systems with malware usually need a vehicle to reach as many infections as possible. These days, that vehicle is most often an exploit kit. In this post, we take a closer look at exploit kits, where they fit in the cybercrime industry, what’s inside a typical toolkit, and most importantly, how they work.


A peek into the exploit kit industry

Before we talk about what an exploit kit (EK) is and how it works, let’s first discuss the financial incentive for developing these kits. What drives people to create exploit kits?

Contrary to what most people think, not everyone who commits cyber crime has the technical skills to “hack into a system”. There are those who carry out cyber attacks by simply relying on ready-made tools they purchased in black hat marketplaces on the dark web.

Let’s say that Joe reads this article and learns that ransomware campaigns can be quite lucrative. Being morally flexible, Joe decides to launch a ransomware campaign. Joe then realizes that ransom malware by itself is not enough. He still needs to deliver the malware onto a victim’s system. One way to do that is by taking advantage of certain vulnerabilities in the system. Luckily, people have already written programs for doing just that.

These tiny programs or pieces of code are called ‘exploits’ and can be purchased through black hat hacking forums. The prices of these exploits vary, with zero-day exploits generally priced higher. So if an attacker like Joe gets a hold of an exploit, is he good to go? Not quite yet.

One exploit typically can only target one vulnerability. It’s hard to predict what vulnerabilities are present in a system. So if Joe only targets one vulnerability, chances are he would only be able to compromise a few systems, while ignoring other systems that have other vulnerabilities. If Joe wants to infect those systems too, he needs to acquire exploits for those vulnerabilities as well.

It gets even more complicated because different exploits might be written by different authors. That means, he would have to communicate with several parties. It would be so much easier if he could only deal with one vendor. That’s where exploits kits come in.

An exploit toolkit or kit is a tool, usually written in PHP, that already comes with a collection of exploits. The people who develop exploit kits purchase exploits from exploit authors and package them into one tool. They (the exploit kit developers) then sell their kits to people like Joe.


Some exploit kit licenses have validity periods. Once the license subscription expires, you would need to purchase a new subscription to continue using it. Other exploit kits are offered as a subscription service. The rates typically range from a few hundred dollars per month to a couple thousand dollars per month. This typically includes tech support and updates or patches. For example, there may be patches that introduce new evasion techniques, new exploits, or support for certain malware.

Some of the most notorious exploit kits in recent history include:

  • Angler
  • Rig
  • Neutrino
  • Blackhole
  • Sweet Orange
  • Nuclear
  • Magnitude


Inside an exploit toolkit

When an attacker purchases an exploit kit, he’ll be provided with a management console. Here he’ll see various information and statistics pertinent to his exploit campaign. This is to help him monitor how the overall campaign and the individual exploits are performing.

In addition to the number of times each exploit type was delivered, the attacker will also see where those exploits actually landed. Mostly, he’ll see the countries that were targeted. Cyber attackers normally want to target specific countries (US is the usual favorite), so they want to verify whether the campaign was actually successful in that geographical region. Toolkits can focus on specific areas through geolocation based on the victim’s IP address.

Another key piece of information is the victim’s Operating System and web browser. Certain malware only works on certain operating systems (e.g. Windows), so it’s important for the payloads to be dropped in those systems.

Here’s a screen grab from a Youtube video showing Black Hole EK’s management console:

screengrab blackholeek

Lastly, a toolkit would typically include a module for uploading or selecting the desired payload. The attacker can either pick from a selection of payloads bundled with the kit or upload his own payload. Some of the most commonly used payloads include:

  • Click-fraud bots (e.g. Bedep)
  • Ransomware (e.g. CryptXXX, TelsaCrypt)
  • Spambots (e.g. Tofsee)
  • Banking Trojans (e.g. Zeus, Panda Banker)
  • Worms (e.g. Qbot)
  • Botnets (e.g. Andromeda/Gamarue)
  • And many others


How exploit kits work

There are different kinds of exploit kits, but the most popular are those designed to exploit vulnerabilities in web browsers and browser plugins like Flash, Silverlight, Java, and ActiveX.

Below is a simplified diagram illustrating a web-based exploit kit. The actual set ups are often far more sophisticated than this and can also involve other processes, but this should give you an idea of the basic structure.



1.    Victim lands on a compromised website

The first stage of an exploit kit attack begins when a victim visits a compromised website. These are usually popular, legitimate websites, including blogs, news sites, and social networking sites. Examples of high-traffic sites that have already been hijacked by exploit kit attackers in the past include: BBC, Yahoo, MSN, AOL, MySpace, Forbes, and New York Times, to mention a few.

The way attackers do this varies. Some attackers target vulnerabilities in CMS (content management system) plugins or in the CMS themselves. Others, like those that carry out domain shadowing, take advantage of weak login credentials. There are also those who perform cross-site scripting, SQL-injection, or FTP compromise. Perhaps the most popular method, though, is malvertising.

In a malvertising campaign, attackers target ad networks. This then allows them to reach a wide range of legitimate (and often high-traffic) websites without having to hack into the websites themselves.


2. Victim is redirected to the exploit kit’s landing page

Once the victim visits a compromised site or one that serves malvertising-infected ads, the victim’s browser will then be redirected to the exploit kit’s landing page. This redirection is carried out through an HTML iframe, 302 cushioning or some surreptitious code that the attacker previously injected into the legitimate website or malicious ad.

This article about the Stegano exploit kit offers a nice example of how a typical malvertising campaign and the use of a banner ad laced with a malicious script works.

As soon as the victim gets redirected to the landing page, the profiling process begins. Here, pertinent information regarding the victim’s browser and its plugins is collected. What the exploit kit will want to know is the kind of vulnerabilities that are present on either the web browser or the browser’s plugins. Because each browser or plugin version will have already been associated with a set of known vulnerabilities, it’s usually enough to just determine the version numbers.


3. Exploits are served

Once the version numbers (and consequently, the corresponding vulnerabilities) have been identified, the exploit kit will know which exploits to deliver. In most cases, the landing page is only used for profiling. The exploits and the payloads are usually hosted on a separate server. In fact, in many cases, these two (exploits and payloads) are likewise separated as well.

The first thing that gets delivered to the victim’s browser are the exploits. As you have already learned, these exploits will take advantage of the vulnerabilities that have been previously identified. If the exploit or exploits are successful, the exploit kit then delivers the final blow.


4. Malicious payload is delivered

At this final stage, the exploit kit drops whatever payload it was configured for. As mentioned earlier, the payload can be ransomware, a keylogger, a banking trojan, or just about any type of malware.


How exploit kit attacks succeed

The main reason that these kits are so effective is that the malicious payloads are usually delivered without the victim having to click or intentionally download anything. All the victim has to do is visit a compromised site, and the payload will be downloaded automatically in the background.

Known as a drive-by-download, this covert method is a staple in many exploit kits and is one of the primary reasons they succeed in delivering various forms of malware. Since the victim doesn’t notice anything alarming or suspicious, they are less likely to think anything is amiss.

Another major reason why these kits succeed is because a lot of people don’t patch their software. Patches typically include security updates that fix known vulnerabilities. So, if people don’t patch, the vulnerabilities will remain. In fact, some exploit kit exploits have been found to target vulnerabilities that have already been known for years. Until we have a better solution for handling updates or remove the incentive to launch these attacks, there will be a busy trade in exploit kits.

7 Biggest Malware Threats of 2017

biggest_malware_threats_2017There are few worse ways to start the new year than scrambling to recover urgently needed files encrypted by ransomware. Unfortunately, the chances of that happening in your organization only seems to be growing. What’s more, although ransomware infections are arguably the most publicized, they’re not the only malware poised to pounce in the Year of the Rooster.

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles” – Sun Tzu

In this post, we help you prepare for this year’s wave of malware attacks by identifying which types of malware are most likely to hit your organization.


1. Ransomware

Easily the most disruptive, and publicized malware of 2016, ransomware is positioned to become a much bigger threat in 2017. Ransomware cyber crooks raked in no less than $1 billion last year. The amount of profit that can potentially be earned from this type of malware is enough to attract even more cyber criminals.

A ransomware attack is typically characterized by files or entire systems being held captive, usually through encryption, and freed only after victims pay up, usually through Bitcoin. While most victims are individuals, there were many instances when infections managed to spread throughout an organization and crippled entire networks, like in the case of the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center and San Francisco’s Municipal Transport Agency (a.k.a. Muni).

It’s easy to see why launching ransomware attacks is a lucrative business model. A large number (if not most) of victims are willing to pay. We discussed the possible drivers behind ransomware’s recent rapid growth in the blog post “The Secrets Behind Ransomware’s Surging Notoriety”.


2. IoT botnets

If it weren’t ransomware up there in number 1, it would most likely have been IoT botnets. Last year, we witnessed some of the largest DDoS attacks of all time. Some of these record-breaking attacks were launched not through typical zombie computers, but rather, through botnets of IoT (Internet of Things) devices.

Many of these attacks were carried out by a single botnet known as Mirai. Unfortunately, the source code of the Mirai malware was shared to the hacking community, setting into motion separate initiatives for the development of Mirai-like offspring. As more cyber gangs gain access to the code, the likelihood of new and improved versions of the malware is likely.

IoT adoption has started to go mainstream. If Gartner’s predictions were accurate, 43% of organizations ended up implementing IoT technology by the end of 2016. With even more companies planning to use IoT and several IoT vulnerabilities still waiting to be plugged, criminals are going to have a massive source of vulnerable devices at their disposal.


3. Extra cautious exploit kits

When the Stegano Exploit Kit was exposed last December, a lot of the attention was focused on how it used steganography to avoid detection. Although steganography certainly contributed to its avoidance capabilities, there was an even craftier mechanism working behind the scenes.

Before Stegano EK would proceed with each attack, it would first verify whether any monitoring or security product was present. If it found one, it would promptly retreat. It did this twice, in fact. First, before redirecting the browser to the exploit kit’s landing page, and secondly, before dropping the payload. This, as much as its use of steganography, allowed Stegano to avoid detection for so long.

By being extra cautious and extra selective of its targets, exploit kits like Stegano might not be able to infect as quickly as others, but it does enable them to remain in existence much longer. As is often said, the biggest malware infections are most likely the ones that have yet to be uncovered.


4. Android malware

Android continues to dominate the mobile market, as well as the mobile malware market. The Android platform has long been plagued with vulnerabilities and in July 2016 alone, Google released a massive security update that aimed to address 108 vulnerabilities in Android. Just last week, security researchers discovered what is now known as the Switcher Trojan, malware that infects Android devices and uses them to attack routers, altering the router’s DNS settings and rerouting DNS queries to attacker-controlled networks.

Smartphones contain mountains of confidential information, including passwords, credit card data, and a large collection of personal details. In many cases, particularly in BYOD environments, smartphones even contain company-owned data. The amount of valuable information that can be stolen from smartphones makes them a prime target for identity thieves and cyber criminals of all stripes.


5. Malware distributed through malvertising

The types of malware dropped through malvertising campaigns can vary substantially. Some drop spyware, some keyloggers, others ransomware, etc.

Malvertising often infects through drive-by downloads. This method of infection doesn’t require any deliberate action from the victim, making it particularly dangerous. The victim doesn’t have to click, download, or install anything. As soon as the victim lands on a web page serving a malicious or compromised ad, the victim will be automatically redirected to a malicious server.

That server can then download an exploit kit that will, in turn scan for vulnerabilities and subsequently drop the payload. All this happens in the background, without any hint to the user of it taking place. The level of obscurity achieved by drive-by downloads makes malvertising a very compelling means of attack.

In addition, some cyber crooks manage to hijack ad networks, enabling them to display their malvertising on multiple legitimate, high-traffic websites. In this way, even those individuals who take care to avoid sketchy websites can still be victimized.


6. Banking/financial malware

Not so long ago, banking trojans and botnets towered over the malware landscape. The first piece of malware that comes to mind is Zeus/Zbot, a trojan that became the foundation of what has now evolved into the Zeus malware family. This trojan primarily stole banking information through man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form grabbing.

Malware developers built on top of Zbot to create even more sophisticated malware. One of Zbot’s offsprings is Gameover Zeus, a notorious botnet that infected over a million users around the globe. It stole login credentials and credit card data, which were later used to carry out banking fraud. Other descendants of Zbot include SpyEye, Ice IX, Citadel, Carberp, Bugat, and many others. Banks won’t be going away anytime soon, and while they’re here, they’ll always be a prime target for cyber criminals.


7. Point of Sale (POS) malware

Closely related to banking malware, in the sense that it also steals credit card and debit card information, POS or Point of Sale malware targets POS terminals. POS devices are simply specialized types of computers and actually run on operating systems like Windows, Unix, or Linux, making them just as vulnerable to malware as a traditional computer.

These terminals often process hundreds or thousands of transactions per day and thus store a ton of payment card data. Much of this data finds its way to hacking forums where it can be bought for identity or credit card fraud.

POS malware has become more popular than manual methods like skimming, which requires the installation of a device on the POS terminal. Skimming is time-consuming, and riskier for criminals since they have to be physically present in order to install the device.

Some of the more notable companies that were attacked in 2016 through some kind of POS malware include Wendy’s, Cici’s Pizza, and Rosen Hotels and Resorts. Of course, the most highly publicized attack involving POS malware happened a couple of years ago; the infamous Target data breach involved millions of credit and debit cards.

Like banks, credit cards aren’t going away. While e-commerce and online shopping is on the rise, most credit card transactions still happen in grocery stores, restaurants, and other brick-and-mortar establishments. As such, POS malware will continue to thrive

Malware Using Steganography to Hide Malicious Code

The biggest malware infections are probably the ones that have yet to be uncovered. Earlier this month, security researchers revealed a massive malvertising-based exploit kit whose earliest variants may have been operating since 2014 and whose infected banner ads might have already been displayed to millions. How could it have remained hidden in plain sight for so long? Apparently, it evaded detection through a combination of fingerprinting/probing and steganography.

The folks at ESET, who recently carried out extensive research on this cyber attack, are attributing the infections to what they now call the Stegano exploit kit. The name comes from the way the exploit kit conceals its malicious code on banner ads, i.e., through steganography.

Steganography is a known technique (not always for malicious purposes) for concealing content inside another piece of content. In most cases, that “other piece of content” is an image. And in this particular case, that image is the one on the banner ad. The content being concealed here is a malicious script and some accompanying variables.

Stegano EK is believed to have reached millions of users. The reason is because it managed to serve its malicious ads on advertising networks whose content is displayed on high traffic news websites. The volume of visitors on these sites number in the millions … per day.


An overview of how the Stegano exploit kit works.

1. Initial environment check.

When a user arrives at an infected news site’s web page, the web page loads along with the malicious banner ad. But before loading the ad, Stegano does an initial check. It does this through a modified version of countly. Countly is a tool normally used for web analytics, so it doesn’t raise any red flags.

The modified tool then reports back to the attacker’s server, providing it with information that enables the server to determine whether to display a clean ad or a malicious ad.


2. Malicious ad is served

The malicious ad is almost identical to the clean ad, except that it has a slightly modified alpha channel. The alpha channel is that part of an RGBA (red green blue alpha) image that dictates a pixel’s degree of transparency. Because the change in the malicious image’s alpha channel is so minimal, the difference between the malicious ad and the clean ad is virtually imperceptible to the naked eye.

However, because a banner’s image consists of a large number of pixels, that difference is enough to conceal information. In this case, malicious script. That script then checks the user’s system for a vulnerability in Internet Explorer (CVE-2016-0162) which allows the exploit kit to determine whether any tools and applications normally used by security professionals are present in the system. If any packet capturing, sandboxing, virtualization and similar applications are found, the exploit kit promptly backs off.


3. Exploit stage

In the event the exploit kit determines the coast is clear, it then redirects the victim’s browser to the exploit landing page. The landing page then loads a Flash file, which in turn exploits any of three Flash-related vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-8651, CVE-2016-1019, CVE-2016-4117).

If the exploit succeeds, Stegano then drops its payload(s), which may range from keyloggers, trojans, to ransomware. Before downloading the payload, Stegano performs yet another check to determine the presence of security tools. It’s this highly cautious approach (coupled with steganography) that has allowed Stegano to avoid detection for so long.


Other malware that has used steganography

While the use of steganography is certainly a unique way of hiding malicious information, Stegano EK isn’t the only malware that has employed this technique. Here are some examples of malware that have also done it in the past.



A variant of the notorious banking trojan Zeus/Zbot, ZeusVM is one of the more popular pieces of malware that has used steganography. Unlike Stegano though, ZeusVM didn’t hide malicious code in an image. Instead, it hid its configuration data in it. This data, which is equally vital to the malware’s functionality, included domains of banking and financial institutions which the malware targeted.

The configuration data was appended to the image and encrypted using Base64, RC4, and XOR to make it indecipherable to anyone who decided to inspect the image more closely. The ZeusVM toolkit, which included a builder that would enable the user to inject the malware’s config to any JPG file, was spread online, so several script kiddies were able to get their hands on it.



Also known as VAWTRAK, Gozi is a banking trojan that steals personal information and credentials (usually through screen captures and keyloggers) that are then used by the attackers to carry out fraudulent transactions. Gozi leveraged steganography to hide a configuration file that contained a list of domain names that in turn corresponded to its Command and Control servers.

The configuration data was hidden in what is known as a favicon. This is a tiny icon (.ico) associated with a website that’s displayed on a web browser. So, for example, you have favicon for Wikipedia and a different favicon for, say, Yahoo. Because it’s normal for websites to be accompanied by a favicon, security solutions failed to flag the favicon downloads as threats.

Gozi more closely resembled Stegano in the manner by which it hid malicious information. Unlike ZeusVM, which simply appended malicious information to the image, Gozi (like Stegano) made very small changes to the image’s pixels. But while Stegano altered the alpha channel, Gozi altered the least significant bits (LSB) of the R, G, B, and A parameters of each pixel.



Most malware that use steganography hide malicious information in visually appealing images like cats or sunsets. However, there is one that hid the information in what looked like plain white images but actually had very small alterations in its pixels.

The use of “white color” is actually very clever because the naked eye can’t differentiate between a pure white pixel (RGB = 255,255,255) and one that’s slightly grey (e.g. RGB = 254, 254, 254). Again, that difference, when spread across the pixels that comprise the entire image, is enough to contain malicious information.

This is the kind of image that Lurk used. Lurk is primarily a downloader. When it was discovered, Lurk’s usual payload was click-fraud malware. To retrieve the URL of the malware it was configured to download, Lurk first downloaded an image (the “white” image we discussed earlier), extracted the LSB from each pixel, performed some XOR operations to decode, and then used the retrieved URL to download the actual payload.

To illustrate how difficult it is to distinguish between pure white (RGB=255,255,255) and slightly greyish white with RGB = 254,254,254, try to compare the two images below. The top NEMESIS logo uses pure white, while the bottom logo uses slightly greyish white with RGB = 254,254,254.


Can you tell the difference?




This is one piece of malware that has a couple of similarities with Stegano. Stegoloader is primarily an information stealer but consists of several modules. Its downloader module is the one that employs steganography.

Its use of steganography isn’t the only characteristic that makes Stegoloader similar to Stegano. First, like Stegano, Stegoloader initially inspects the target system to make sure it’s not running in an analysis environment or that any security tools are present. If it determines that the environment is not safe enough, it automatically aborts the attack. Secondly, unlike Gozi and Lurk, which simply hid URLs, Stegoloader (like Stegano) also hid code.


How to protect your system from Stegano

There are a couple of ways to protect yourself from a Stegano EK attack. There’s absolutely no way you can identify a malicious banner ad by simply looking at it, so you can forget about countering the steganography part of the attack.

First, you can simply avoid using Internet Explorer. The first vulnerability Stegano exploits, which allows it to detect any security monitoring software, is an IE vulnerability. So if you use Chrome, Firefox, or Safari, that could put Stegano off.

Second, you can either update your Adobe Flash installations, switch Flash off, or stop using Flash altogether. This month, Chrome will stop using Flash as the default enabler of web media. The makers of Firefox, Safari, and Edge (Microsoft’s replacement for IE) are also planning a similar move, so that’s something you might want to put into consideration when prescribing browsers to your end users.

Third, you can deploy advanced anti-malware solutions. Remember that, as part of Stegano’s (and Stegoloader’s) security avoidance techniques, it scans for security tools. If it finds one, it will back off.

SF Transit System Held Hostage by Ransomware

sf-muni-ransomware-attackWhile most ransomware incidents go unreported, the attack on San Francisco’s Municipal Transport Agency (locally known as Muni) last Black Friday was hard to keep under wraps. The conspicuous message on the screens at ticketing agents’ booths said it all: “You Hacked, ALL Data Encrypted, Contact For Key (cryptom27@yandex.com)ID:681,Enter Key.”

SFMTA, which operates fleets of buses, cable cars, historic streetcars, light railway vehicles (subway), trolley buses and a handful of other public transportations, is now part of a rapidly growing list of businesses that have been victimized by ransomware. For more about this highly disruptive menace of a malware, read our post “The Secrets Behind Ransomware’s Surging Notoriety”.

The disruption from the ransomware attack on Muni, which affected over 2,000 computers, began Friday night and continued the entire Saturday. Affected systems had their hard drives encrypted, forcing the SFMTA to switch off ticket machines at the subway stations. As a result, the commuters were able to get free rides that weekend.

People who communicated with the email address left by the hackers were told that the ransom amount was 100 bitcoins, roughly equivalent to $73,000. This is much bigger than another high-profile ransomware attack that happened earlier this year.

In that attack, the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center ended up paying the ransom of $17,000 worth of bitcoins. Although most attacks only cost about $600-$700, there have been reports of ransom demands reaching up to as high as $150,000.

According to the extortionist who replied at the Yandex email address, SFMTA was not a victim of a targeted attack. Rather, it was more likely that someone working at SFMTA unwittingly downloaded a trojan that actually contained the ransomware. The reason the malware was able to spread through the network was likely because the user might have been using a workstation with admin level privileges.

This is consistent with the common characteristics of ransomware. They’re usually designed to spread through non-targeted phishing attacks and exploit kits. Whomever accidentally downloads the malware becomes a victim. Not all ransomware has worm-like capabilities that allow it to propagate through the network, but sadly for SFMTA, this one did.

There has been no indication that SFMTA paid any ransom to get their systems back. In fact, it’s believed their IT folks managed to recover from backups. Backups are an effective way of recovering from a ransomware attack. However, you shouldn’t be over-dependent on them, as ransomware developers have started introducing features that enable their malware to spread to backup systems as well.

So, which particular ransomware was responsible for this attack? Apparently, that distinction goes to HDDCryptor. Upon infection, which is initiated through a downloaded executable, HDDCryptor drops several components in the Windows root folder and then runs a service known as DefragmentService. The service is responsible for maintaining the malware’s persistence in the infected system.

HDDCryptor is designed to identify currently mounted drives as well as previously connected drives and then encrypt all files. To encrypt, the malware relies on an open source disk encryption software known as DiskCryptor. DiskCryptor also enables HDDCryptor to overwrite the Master Boot Record and display the ransom message.

Because of the malware’s capability to scan the system for mounted drives and previously accessed network folders, it’s highly possible that backups (depending on how they were configured) were also infected.

This particular case brings to the fore the cyber threats faced by public transportation and utilities. While this attack fortunately did not result in any physical harm, future attacks might not be as harmless.

How Does A Botnet Attack Work?

botnetBotnets are responsible for many of the cyber attacks we encounter these days; from DDoS and spam attacks to keylogging and click fraud. In today’s post, we take a closer look at how a botnet attack works – how it gains a foothold into each botnet slave, how each slave communicates with the C&C servers, and how the entire botnet carries out nefarious acts.


Malware infection

All botnets are networks of enslaved devices known as “bots”. That’s really where the term “botnet” comes from. And so, before a botnet comes into existence, a large number of devices must first be infected with malware that turn these devices into unwitting bots (a.k.a. zombies).

So how do these devices get infected in the first place? Well, it depends on the type of device. In the case of desktops, laptops, phones, and tablets, these devices typically get infected when the people using them either:

  1. Visit a malicious site and download malware without noticing it (a.k.a. drive-by-download) or
  2. Consciously download a file through an email or website without knowing it’s actually malware (a.k.a. a trojan).

In the case of IoT devices, they usually get compromised after attackers actively break into them. For example, the attacks that ensnared IoT devices into the Mirai botnet and Mirai-wannabes, the attackers used automated tools that scanned networks for weak passwords, broke in through brute force, and installed the malware.

Once devices become infected and become bots, they then communicate with the command and control servers or C&Cs.


Botnet C&Cs

The C&Cs are the servers that deliver commands to the bots, directing them to targets and instructing them what to do. Traditionally, botnets operate under a client-server model, wherein the bots act as the botnet clients and the C&Cs act as the servers. There can be one or more Command and Control servers in a botnet.

Having multiple C&Cs provides redundancy and enables botnets to acquire high availability capabilities. Meaning, if one C&C goes down, the botnet clients can still receive commands from the other C&Cs. Nevertheless, having multiple C&Cs doesn’t make a client-server-type botnet indestructible. Its survival still relies heavily on the C&Cs. If the C&Cs are identified and eventually brought down, the entire botnet will be no more.

This is how massive botnets like Mariposa and Bredolab were dismantled. After their C&Cs were tracked down, the end of these malicious networks became imminent.

Today, many botnets follow a different architecture. To avoid total reliance on a group of C&Cs, these botnets now use a P2P model, wherein each botnet client also functions as a C&C. This type of botnet is much harder to take down.


Botnet Communications

Most bots communicate with their C&Cs using either one of two communications protocols – IRC (Internet Relay Chat) or HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol). Other botnets also employ other communication methods but these two are definitely the most commonly used.

IRC communications can be easily automated (using scripts). In addition, open source IRC servers are readily available. That’s why this protocol used to be a perfect fit for botnet creation and deployment. During infection, a typical botnet malware would install an IRC client, which in turn would then communicate with the IRC server on the C&C.

The characteristics of IRC, while a boon for botnet operations, has ironically also become many a botnet’s undoing. If you really think about it, Internet Relay Chat is no longer a common method of communication (most people now use Instant Messaging applications). And so, ever since IRC became associated with botnets, the presence of IRC packets has often raised red flags. Some system admins even started blocking IRC packets in their firewalls.

It is for this reason that malware writers have started to turn to a more firewall-friendly option as their botnet communication protocol of choice. And what network protocol can be more firewall-friendly than HTTP? All websites (including popular ones like Google, Facebook, and Amazon) all communicate via HTTP. So if a botnet uses HTTP, there’s a lower chance of it getting flagged down because, unlike IRC packets, HTTP packets don’t easily stand out.

Zeus, one of the most notorious botnets ever, communicated via HTTP. In fact, several exploit kits incorporate HTTP communications into their botnet malware payloads.


Botnet attacks

One of the most common botnet attacks is the DDoS or Distributed Denial of Service attack. In this type of attack, all bots send out requests to a target server with the purpose of overwhelming it and preventing legitimate requests from getting through or processed.

Another common botnet attack – in fact, arguably the most common cyber attack that employs botnets – is sending out tons of spam. In a typical spam attack, bots send out spam emails to target email addresses with the purpose of getting click-throughs and, ultimately, generating ad revenue.

Botnets can also be used to steal information from enslaved devices. Some bot clients operate as keyloggers that record end user keystrokes. Keyloggers can, for example, record the password characters an end user enters during login and then send this information to the bot herders.

Lastly, botnets can also be used for click fraud activities. Bot clients can click on ads and trick ad networks that the clicks came from legitimate end users.


Preventing botnet attacks

Botnet malware infections can be avoided by educating end-users about the risks and best practices of downloading email attachments and visiting web sites. Of course, this countermeasure has its limitations. Most end users find security practices too tedious and time consuming, and often disregard them. Further, some threats (like drive-by-downloads) are just too difficult to avoid.

The best way would is to employ advanced malware protection solutions. These solutions typically combine advanced network behaviour analysis and real time intelligence to detect even the most stealthy malware infections.

Mirai Isn’t the Only IoT Botnet You Should Worry About

mirai-iot-botnetIoT botnets have been responsible for multiple record-breaking DDoS attacks that managed to cripple even some of the most resilient networks in the world.

So far, the largest attacks have been caused by one particular malware family – Mirai. Although the original botnet is probably on its way out, its offspring and competitors in the malware trade are on the rise.




Record breaking DDoS attacks

The Mirai’s claim to fame included massive attacks on the Krebs On Security site (620 Gbps), French web host OVH (1 Tbps), and DNS provider Dyn (1.2 Tbps). That attack on Dyn, the largest DDoS on record (for now), prevented users in Europe and North America from connecting to a large number of popular sites.

Twitter, Amazon, CNN, PayPal, Reddit, Visa, SoundCloud, and AirBnB were just some of the many high-profile sites that were affected by that single attack.

Mirai malware source code

There seemed to be a sliver of good news when a Hackforums user, whom some believed was the creator of Mirai, expressed intention of hanging up his/her cape. Going by the nickname of “Anna-senpai”, the user posted that when he/she first entered into the DDoS industry, he/she “wasn’t planning on staying in it long.”, adding that “I made my money, there’s lots of eyes looking at IOT now, so it’s time to GTFO”

But as it turned out, the entire announcement was really a portent of what could potentially be an even greater threat. The user continued the post saying, “So today, I have an amazing release for you…”. That release turned out to be the source code of the Mirai malware itself. The source code can now be found on Github.

So with the Mirai source code out in the open, what else could anyone expect? Naturally, it shouldn’t take long for other miscreants to develop their own versions of IoT botnet malware.

That’s probably what happened here…



Very recently, a botnet with similar characteristics as Mirai was discovered by researchers at white hat security research group MalwareMustDie.org. Dubbed Linux/IRCTelnet, this botnet snags IoT devices by taking advantage of the default passwords hard-coded in them. These passwords are usually weak (and hence easily broken by brute force attacks) or have already been disclosed in hacking forums (some, via the Mirai botnet).

The botnet clients receive commands from malicious C&C IRC servers through the Telnet protocol. To cripple targets, the Linux/IRCTelnet can carry out Denial-of-Service mechanisms like UDP flood, TCP flood, and several other attacks through both the IPv4 or IPv6 protocols.


Another IoT botnet we should be worried about is Bashlite. While Linux/IRCTelnet is still on the rise, Bashlite is already quite well established. Apparently, this malware family has already managed to infect a million endpoint devices, the majority of which are IoT devices, and has even been used to conduct DDoS attacks-for-hire.

Like the other two IoT botnets, Bashlite also exploits default usernames and passwords. It can launch TCP and UDP floods, and can even carry out HTTP attacks.

The malicious code used by these types of malware reside in memory. So, theoretically, they can be removed by simply restarting the compromised devices. However, the volume of scans conducted by these malware are so large, that they can also as easily re-infect the restarted devices.

The use of default or non-configurable login credentials is one of the vulnerabilities we outlined in our post “IoT Vulnerabilities – What Should You Secure?”. Unless this vulnerability, which exists in a large number of IoT devices out there, is addressed, IoT botnets like Linux/IRCTelnet and Mirai will continue to exploit it.

IoT Vulnerabilities – What Should You Secure?

iot-vulnerabilitiesWe’ve already seen what IoT vulnerabilities can lead to. The massive DDoS attacks on DYN, was easily one of the largest DDoS attack ever. As it turned out, that attack was launched not from the usual botnet of hijacked servers, but from a multitude of IoT devices.


It happened before. It can happen again.

Sadly, the use of IoT devices as an attack vector is just one of the myriad of security issues that now plague this nascent technological ecosystem. It’s important to grasp the implications of these developments and see if we can learn from what has happened in the past.

Not so long ago, we also saw the explosion of the Internet. During the early stages of its rapid growth, architects, engineers, and developers rolled out wave upon wave of technologies that, while equipped with great functionality, were seriously lacking in security. Protocols like FTP, HTTP, and Telnet are the first few examples that come to mind.

Many of these grossly insecure technologies, which even now are still used by many organizations, are putting people and businesses at risk. Attackers exploit their vulnerabilities to steal confidential information, infiltrate networks, or carry out a variety of nefarious acts.

Alarmingly, we seem to be experiencing deja vu with the Internet of Things. Stimulated by the almost unlimited supply of IP addresses through IPv6 along with technological advancements and cost reductions, we’re now seeing a market being flooded by a plethora of products. But close inspection of these products reveal that many of them were built with very little regard to security.

The Open Web Application Security Project has identified these ten (10) as the top vulnerabilities and security issues that afflict most IoT devices and their supporting systems.


1.   Insecure Web Interface

Most IoT devices are administered through a Web Interface. Unfortunately, many of these Web interfaces have weak security. For example, some of them simply accept login credentials in plaintext. Others don’t require the use of strong passwords. Still others don’t have provisions to lock out users who have made several failed login attempts (an indication of a brute force attack). If these weaknesses are not addressed, they can be exploited and subsequently result in data loss or even loss of control over the device.


2.   Insufficient Authentication/Authorization

When IoT is introduced into highly critical areas like energy, healthcare, manufacturing, transportation, and telecommunications, run-of-the-mill authentication/authorization systems are not enough. IoT systems deployed in mission-critical areas must be equipped with multi-factor authentication and granular access control mechanisms that can substantially reduce the risk of unauthorized access.

Without strong authentication/authorization systems, administrative user accounts can easily fall into the hands of impostors, who will then have the ability to execute commands or access other parts of the internal network. These malicious individuals can then wreak havoc and endanger lives and property.


3.   Insecure Network Services

IoT systems rely heavily on network communications. For this reason, these networks must be tightly secured. Otherwise, network services can be compromised through buffer overflows, fuzzing, DDoS, and other forms of attacks.

First, devices can be rendered unusable. Second, they can either be subjected to a denial of service attack or themselves used to launch such attacks. The DDoS attacks on KrebsOnSecurity.com and DYN are perfect examples of what can happen when IoT devices fall into the wrong hands.


4.   Lack of Transport Encryption/Integrity Verification

In an IoT environment, data transmissions are usually carried out between several endpoints. There may be data exchanges between:

  • Mobile apps and front-end cloud services
  • Web applications and front-end cloud services
  • IoT devices and back-end cloud services
  • Mobile apps and IoT devices
  • IoT devices and other IoT devices

Ideally, these data exchanges should be transmitted through TLS-protected protocols or other secure channels. But if these communications are carried out over unencrypted protocols, transmitted data can be intercepted and acquired.

Depending on the kind of data that ends up compromised, attackers can do different things to it. If it were login credentials, those credentials could be used for gaining access to the system. Other pieces of data could be aggregated and then used to provide insightful information regarding certain behaviors of either the users or the system as a whole. Still others could be tampered with, thereby harming the integrity of the system.


5.   Privacy Concerns

Some IoT devices collect and store personal information such as the user’s birthday, phone number, home address, gender, or, worse, financial or health information. This can have huge repercussions from a privacy perspective, as personal information can be used to perform identity theft. Businesses that use these kinds of IoT devices are subject to the requirements of laws and regulations like HIPAA, PCI-DSS, SOX, GLBA, and several state data breach notification legislations.

Thus, if your business is operating in a highly regulated industry and you’re planning to deploy IoT devices in the workplace, you should make sure personal information is adequately protected.


6.   Insecure Cloud Interface

Cloud services are vital to IoT systems. They facilitate data exchanges between IoT devices and their respective web/mobile applications as well as data exchanges between IoT devices and other IoT devices. It’s also where the bulk of the data gathered by IoT endpoints are stored and processed. This data is used for analytics, control, integration with enterprise applications, and several other purposes.

It’s therefore imperative to ensure the security of cloud interfaces. Failure to do so may result in massive data loss as well as loss of control of all devices connected to the cloud platform. Worse, if these cloud services are also connected to enterprise applications, those applications can likewise be at risk of getting attacked. Poorly designed cloud interfaces usually suffer from weak authentication/authorization mechanisms, lack of data-in-motion encryption, and other access control deficiencies.


7.   Insecure Mobile Interface

There are usually two ways to administer/manage IoT devices. One is through a web interface, which we discussed earlier, another is through a mobile interface, i.e. through an app running on an iOS, Android, or Windows device. Like web interfaces, mobile interfaces need to be equipped with strong authentication/authorization mechanisms.

If an attacker manages to gain unauthorized access into an IoT device’s corresponding mobile app, that attacker will in turn be able to control the IoT device. In other words, he could, for example, open doors, manipulate processes, cut off power, or shut down support systems.


8.   Insufficient Security Configurability

Secure devices are usually equipped with configurable security features. You can, for example, choose the number and type of characters required for password authentication. It might be all right if the built-in security level is only high/strict. But this is seldom the case. Devices that have non-configurable security are usually set to low levels of security.


9.   Insecure Software/Firmware

Some IoT devices perform firmware updates (mostly during restarts or at regular time intervals) through insecure network protocols like TFTP. On its own, TFTP is neither encrypted nor is it equipped with strong authentication features. Hence, it is highly vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.

Once an attacker is able to grab the firmware update as it traverses the network, he could modify it to serve his own purposes. After tampering with it, the attacker can then push the modified update to the device and subsequently gain control. If the device is a hub that communicates with other IoT devices, the attacker might then be able to take over those devices as well.

These man-in-the-middle attacks are typically carried out in the local network. However, it’s also possible to perform a malicious update through Internet-based attacks like DNS hijacking.

Equally important is the ability of the device to perform security updates. If the device is incapable of carrying out updates, it wouldn’t be able to patch security vulnerabilities.


10.       Poor Physical Security

The physical security of an IoT device, especially one used in a business setting, is as critical as the other technical security we mentioned earlier in this post. Imagine what could happen if a malicious individual gains physical access to a mission-critical device.

He could remove or break into the storage medium and extract whatever information is stored there. If the device is equipped with external ports like a USB port or an SD card slot, the intruder could gain access through those and attack the operating system or storage medium.

It might seem like a pretty long list but there’s really no way around it. IoT is poised to be tightly interwoven into the fabric of society. If IoT systems can be easily compromised, the potential damage to people (not just IT systems or infrastructure) can be catastrophic. It is therefore imperative that businesses carefully scrutinize what and how IoT systems are incorporated into the organization and ensure that more than just adequate security is enforced.


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DDoS Takes Down Krebs’ Site

super-ddos-akamai-krebsonsecurityLate last week, one of the leading sources of cyber security news was shut down after getting hit by one of the largest DDoS attacks in history. The massive assault on KrebsOnSecurity.com came after the site’s owner, Brian Krebs, reported on the exploits and business operations of a company that offers DDoS attacks-for-hire services.

A couple of weeks prior to the attack, Krebs brought to light the activities of vDOS, a company that rendered services for people who wanted to subject certain organizations to a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack. This type of attack is designed to cripple servers by overwhelming them with a flood of network traffic.

vDOS is believed to be behind many of the larger DDoS attacks that have been carried out in the last couple of years. The group had been operating under the radar all this time and is estimated to have amassed no less than $600,000 USD.

In Krebs’ exposé, it was revealed that vDOS was operated by two Israeli teenagers who launched their attacks mainly through servers in Bulgaria. According to Kreb’s article, vDOS not only provided DDoS services to direct customers, they also provided “firepower” to other outfits who, like them, also offered booter services.

Krebs managed to acquire substantial information about vDOS through a source who was investigating another booter service provider called PoodleStresser. During the investigation, that source was able to acquire configuration data from PoodleStresser’s attack servers. Some of the configuration data pointed to vDOS. The source then managed to gain access to vDOS’ servers and acquire databases and configuration files, which in turn led to more disclosures.

The two alleged owners of vDOS were eventually arrested by the FBI (although it’s not known whether the arrest was fueled by Krebs’ revelations). The duo have since been released under a bond of USD $10,000, placed under a 10-day house arrest, and prohibited from using the Internet or telecommunications equipment for 30 days.

But that wasn’t the end of it. About two weeks later, KrebsOnSecurity.com was under a DDoS attack. It wasn’t the first for Krebs by any means, but it certainly was (by a very big margin) the largest. Akamai, which provides pro bono DDoS protection to KrebsOnSecurity.com, was able to withstand the assault at first, but at about 620 Gbps, the attack traffic began to take its toll on Akamai’s resources. To continue defending against the sustained assault meant Akamai had to deploy millions of dollars-worth of resources.

Eventually, Akamai had to throw in the towel and KrebsOnSecurity.com had to temporarily go offline. As of this writing, krebsonsecurity.com is back online. It’s now being secured by Project Shield, a free DDoS protection service owned by Google.

Later, analysis of the attack revealed that, unlike most large scale DDoS attacks, which relied on botnets of misconfigured DNS servers, this one seemed to be originating from hacked IoT-enabled consumer electronic devices like routers, digital cameras, smart firewalls, light bulbs, thermostats, espresso machines, and many others.

These events underline how serious the booter services menace has now become and has taught us a few important things:

  • The scale of this attack is alarming and causes everyone to re-evaluate their defences.
  • Attackers have added IoT devices (of which there are billions) to their real-world arsenal.
  • The criminal business model for DDoS has matured and become very lucrative.

It looks like the Internet of things is really growing up.

Now might be a good time to get a free network risk assessment.

HTML 5 Has Vulnerabilities Too


In our last post, we talked about the imminent demise of Flash and how it’s eventually going to be replaced by HTML 5. One of the reasons why Flash is getting axed is its propensity for vulnerabilities. But before you start letting your guard down, you should know that HTML 5 isn’t totally secure either. Today, we’ll talk about some of the HTML 5 vulnerabilities you need to be aware of.

PostMessage vulnerabilities

One of the major vulnerabilities found in HMTL 5 affects cross-origin communications. These types of vulnerabilities can enable hackers to carry out cross-site scripting attacks or lead to unintentional, unauthorized disclosures.

One problem lies in postMessage; an HTML 5 API that allows data to be exchanged between two pages even if they have different origins (i.e. they don’t use the same protocol, port, and hostname). Normally, cross-origin communications aren’t allowed by the web application security model’s Same Origin Policy (SOP). In theory, postMessage is supposed to provide a controlled way of circumventing the SOP. However, if not implemented properly, this API can expose web applications to critical vulnerabilities.

A web application can be exposed to cross-site scripting if the developer of the receiving page allows the page to receive data sent via the postMessage() method but fails to validate the origin of that message. If the message comes from a malicious source and the receiving page processes the message, the receiving page can be compromised.

On the other hand, unauthorized disclosures can happen if the developer of the sending page uses the postMessage() method but doesn’t specify a particular target/receiver for that message. That is, the developer might simply use the wildcard “*”, which, in effect, allows the message to be sent to any receiver regardless of origin. If the message contains sensitive information, that information could end up in a malicious receiving page.

CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) vulnerabilities

Another way to circumvent the Same-Origin Policy and enable cross-domain requests (i.e. between different origins) is through the use of CORS. CORS enables cross-domain requests (typically, XMLHttpRequest AJAX requests through JavaScript) in a controlled manner. It does this by employing the following headers, among others:

● Access-Control-Allow-Origin
● Access-Control-Allow-Credentials
● Access-Control-Allow-Methods

There are instances, however, when the Access-Control-Allow-Origin and Access-Control-Allow-Credentials headers are used insecurely.

The Access-Control-Allow-Origin header specifies which origins are allowed to make requests to and read responses from a CORS-enabled server. When that server receives a request, it checks the value of the request’s Origin header and then validates it against a list of allowed domains/origins.

The validation process can vary. Some processes look for a particular string, others use regular expressions, and so on. If the submitted Origin value passes the validation process, the server replies with an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header that contains the submitted value. This is where the problem lies. If the validation process is flawed, the server could end up unintentionally allowing access to a malicious domain.

Just like in the case of postMessage(), vulnerabilities can also occur if the server returns an asterisk (*) for the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header, which basically means the server allows all domains to read the response.

The Access-Control-Allow-Credentials header, on the other hand, defines whether cookies will be sent. Cookies will only be sent if this header’s value is set to True.

Almost all cases of CORS-based attacks require that the Access-Control-Allow-Credentials be set to True. That’s because attackers will need cookies to redirect sensitive information from legitimate sites to the sites they (the attackers) own.

Web Storage Vulnerabilities

HTML 5 supports a nifty performance-enhancing feature known as Web Storage. This feature, which also goes by the name “Local Storage” or “Offline Storage”, allows web applications to take advantage of a client-side database. The web application can, for example, use the database to (persistently) store and access often-used data in order to speed up certain processes. Unfortunately, this local storage, which is accessed via JavaScript, can be subjected to XSS or injection attacks.

For example, if a web application is vulnerable to XSS, like when entries in a text field are not properly sanitized, an attacker may inject malicious script through the text field and that script will be stored in web storage. That malicious code would then be executed each time the user loads the browser and accesses the same site.

What’s more, the contents of localStorage can always be viewed by anyone who has access the same browser. So if you’re using a shared computer, access to any sensitive data stored in localStorage will not be restricted to you.

Because of this vulnerability, it’s never safe to store sensitive information in these local storage databases. This includes login credentials (i.e. usernames and passwords), credit card information, personally identifiable information, and others. In other words, any type of information that you wouldn’t normally store or transmit in plaintext should never be stored in web storage.

WebSockets Vulnerabilities

HTML 5’s WebSocket protocol enables persistent, bidirectional (i.e. full duplex) connections between a client and a server. This capability allows developers to create applications that require real-time data exchanges between client and server. The usual applications include online games, live streaming, chat/messaging, and reporting systems.

Here’s one issue that’s been dubbed the Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability. The WebSockets protocol doesn’t have any built-in capability for authentication and authorization during handshake. When a client requests a WebSocket connection, the server can carry out client authentication through typical HTTP authentication mechanisms, including cookies, HTTP authentication, or TLS authentication.

The problem is that WebSockets is not governed by the Same Origin Policy. So if an end user is logged in to a WebSockets-enabled application that’s running on the same web browser as a malicious site, that malicious site can potentially take advantage of the authentication credentials (e.g. a session cookie) and then send them along with a handshake request to the WebSocket URL of the application.

Once authenticated, the malicious site will have established a separate WebSocket connection with the same level of privileges as the original connection. Meaning, the malicious site could potentially have read/write capabilities.

Other areas in HTML 5 that are also afflicted with vulnerabilities include geolocation, web workers, sandboxed frames, and offline applications. Of course, most – if not all – of those vulnerabilities can be avoided through secure coding practices.

For instance, in the case of CORS and postMessage vulnerabilities, the developer simply has to be careful in crafting origin validation. But until all web developers are able to adhere to those practices, there will always be HTML 5 web sites that can be exploited.
The rise of HTML 5 as the de facto standard for multimedia and rich web applications is inevitable. Major browsers are starting to ditch programs like Flash and Silverlight in favor of it. The same reception is expected from end users and IT admins, who will no longer have to install and maintain crash-prone third party plug-ins.

As more and more developers write web applications in HTML 5, people must bear in mind that – like all other technologies – HTML 5 also has its fair share of vulnerabilities and that the bad guys are bound to exploit them whenever they can.

The End of Flash on Chrome

For those who haven’t seen the writing on the wall, it’s finally being read aloud for you. Google is removing Flash from Chrome, and they’ve laid out a timetable for doing it.


Timeline of the Flash Phase out

When Chrome 53 rolls out tyoutube flashhis September, it will start blocking tiny Flash-enabled content. This is what is responsible for things such as page analytics. Although running  in the background, Flash-based page analytics can drag down a web page’s load time and responsiveness while also draining precious battery life.

But that’s just a prelude to what will happen before the year ends. When Chrome 55 arrives in December, that iteration of the world’s most widely used web browser will feature HTML5 as the default enabler for all web media. When that happens, it will signal the end of Adobe Flash’s lengthy reign as the de facto platform for web animations, games, videos, and interactive content.

Many people saw this coming. Back in September 2015, Chrome 42 was released with a default setting that paused Flash-enabled animations that were smaller than 400 x 300 pixels. That default setting did not include content 5×5 pixels and below. The main reason? There was no other way to detect viewability then. With the introduction of Intersection Observer, that is no longer an issue

Chrome isn’t the only browser distancing itself from Flash. The makers of Edge, Firefox, and Safari have all announced similar plans. Like Google, they plan on starting with click-to-play settings before eventually blocking  Flash content by default.


Security Implications

Although what most people notice are the browser crashes, the battery drain, and the sluggish webpage responses, Flash has one more weakness that’s making it even more difficult for companies to justify supporting it. Flash has too many vulnerabilities. Adobe releases security updates quite often,yet the vulnerabilities just keep popping up.

This onslaught of vulnerabilities is the primary reason why Flash is a constant target of exploit kits and other attack packages that pave the way for ransomware, viruses, malware, rootkits, trojans, and a host of other malware. When malware infects systems through drive-by downloads, it’s usually through Flash plugin vulnerabilities.

Flash can put businesses at even greater risk when system admins and users fail to patch or when a zero day vulnerability emerges. A zero-day is a vulnerability that’s initially unknown to the vendor (in this case, Adobe). Until the vendor is informed of the vulnerability, and more importantly, releases a security update, that vulnerability can be exploited.

Because Flash is used in a wide range of Web elements, attackers can get quite creative in crafting an exploit. An attacker can gain access into a system by tricking users to:

  • Launch a PDF
  • Play a video
  • Visit a website (drive-by downloads)
  • Install the “Flash plugin”
  • Or even install a “critical Flash update”

When the time comes for Flash to finally bow out, it will be taking along with it the security holes that attackers have long been taking advantage of.

So does that mean the Web will now be a safer place? Hopefully. HTML5, Flash’s designated successor for browser enhancement and rich internet applications, is considered to be more secure – at least for now. But to clarify, HTML5 is no panacea. It hasits own share of vulnerabilities (e.g. XHR, tag, fat client, and DOM vulnerabilities, to mention a few). We’ll talk about those HTML5 vulnerabilities in a later post. In the meantime, if you’re looking to enhance the security of your organization, give us a trial run today.